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In this Article I want to give you an outsider’s view of international 
law, or at least this outsider’s view.  And by outsider I mean someone 
who is usually interested in legal philosophy and constitutional law and 
who may well be thought to lack standing to offer the sort of views and 
criticisms that are to come. 
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Yet brazenly, or otherwise, I am going to press on and do so anyway. 
It may just be that only someone from outside the international law 
fraternity or guild would have the inclination and motivation to attempt 
this sort of critique.  But even if that is overstating things, my hope is 
that there may be a point or two in what follows that either pushes the 
reader to be slightly more skeptical about the benefits of some aspects of 
international law or provokes the reader to be angry, even if it just be 
with me. 
I am going to make these criticisms from the vantage of someone who 
lives in one of the world’s oldest and longest standing democracies, say 
someone living in the United States, Canada, Australia, or the United 
Kingdom, all jurisdictions with which I am passingly familiar. 
The structure of this Article will be simple.  I will criticize certain aspects 
of international law, especially rights-related international law, under the 
three headings you see in the title to this Article.  However, I am going to 
take those headings and critiques in reverse order to lead with my best foot 
forward.  Yet first, as an entrée into those three headings and my overall 
claims in this Article, I will lay out a short case study. 
I.  CASE STUDY TO INTRODUCE MY CRITICISMS 
How many readers have found themselves unable to sleep some night 
and so decided to have a read of the 1989 United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC)?1  Implausible I know, even for lawyers, 
but it is not the worst strategy for overcoming insomnia.  And in your 
late-night browsing, you would come across Article 19 of that convention 
or treaty. 
Article 19 of the CRC reads in part as follows: “States Parties shall 
take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence . . . .”2  Now think about what you figure that covers and does 
not cover.  And remember, while doing so, that drafters have to word all 
these multilateral treaties such as the CRC to get as many of the world’s 
Sudans, Chinas, and Libyas on board as possible.  Also, ignore for the 
moment that the United States has never ratified the CRC.3  I am not 
here focusing on, say, the failings of the U.N. Human Rights Council 
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1990/09/19900902%2003-14%20AM/ 
Ch_IV_11p.pdf. 
2. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 19.
3.  See Chapter IV Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Feb. 19, 2014, 1:02 PM). 
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and its predecessor the Human Rights Commission—neither the way 
authoritarian regimes manage to get voted onto these bodies nor the patently 
unbalanced obsession they have with Israel.  Both of those criticisms are 
well known.4 
No, my point here is something else, namely that it is not at all clear 
what Article 19 of the CRC means.  Yes, we know that a lot of countries 
whose standards look pretty awful compared with those in the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom have signed the 
CRC.  Additionally, we know that almost all countries at the time of 
signing the CRC had municipal laws that permitted parents to spank 
their own children if the degree of force was reasonable.5 
But let us assume that some democratic government, say one like the 
United States, Canada, Australia, or the United Kingdom, had a statute, 
at the national or state level, that allowed parents to spank their children. 
Would you say that that statute allowing corporal punishment breached 
human rights?  Let me put that question slightly differently.  Would your 
decision on whether parental corporal punishment infringed human 
rights depend upon the proper interpretation of Article 19 of the CRC or 
even be influenced in the least by Article 19?  And if you thought parental 
spanking did not breach human rights but you learned some overseas 
international law experts thought otherwise—ones who were wholly 
undemocratically chosen and included people from countries that were 
undemocratic and even from downright authoritarian regimes—would 
you defer to them?6  Would it matter to you in the least what this handful 
of experts thought?  Would it matter to you if these experts were giving 
their opinions under the aegis of a United Nations body that monitors the 
CRC treaty? 
4.  See, e.g., Brett Allen Casper, Ph.D. Candidate, New York University,
Authoritarian Regimes and the Exploitation of the UN Human Rights Council 1–2, 8 (May 3, 
2013) (transcript available on the New York University, Department of Politics website). 
5.  See After the Fact, PARENTALRIGHTS.ORG, http://www.parentalrights.org/index.asp?
Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7B6E783940-B0D5-495B-9702-512A961FEAF9%7D (last visited  
Mar. 4, 2014). 
6. Not all members of the Committee on the Rights of the Child are lawyers, of
course.  The Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) always has only lawyers serving on it, but that is not true of the 
other treaty committees.  Also, note that unlike the representatives in the Human Rights 
Council, the members of treaty committees are meant to serve in their individual capacities, 
not as representatives of states—though the extent to which there is this independence is 
variable or at least open to question in some instances. 
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These are not off-the-wall questions; this is not a pointless hypothetical. 
You see, all the big United Nations conventions or multilateral treaties, 
including the CRC, have committees set up to monitor the implementation 
progress of the conventions in all the states that have signed them. 
Now at this point, you might like to know a couple of key things. 
Firstly, the membership of these monitoring committees is determined in 
a less than transparent way—nothing remotely close to how U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices are picked—that comes nowhere near letting anyone 
claim those selected have been democratically appointed or anointed. 
Secondly, committee membership includes those from countries whose 
leaders you would not take any moral advice from if your life depended on 
it.  Thirdly, and this is the point to take on board if you remember only 
one, the committee for the CRC has consistently maintained7 that parental 
corporal punishment violates the CRC.8 
When you learn that fact, and fact it is, would your view of the 
acceptability of parental spanking change?  Let us assume it would not; 
it certainly would make no difference to me.  What if I told you, in 
rather more grandiose terms, that international law required that you not 
spank your children because such spanking was a breach of their human 
rights as set out in Article 19 of the CRC?  After all, this is what the 
CRC committee thinks.9 
Two roads now diverge.  Go down one of them and you simply outsource 
your view of the acceptability of spanking to the committee for the CRC.  
You defer to this handful of international law experts, perhaps in the 
name of complying with international law, because you think the committee 
is best placed to know what the vague, amorphous Article 19 provisions 
mean, or even due to your desire to take on board what Jeremy Waldron 
has styled “the guidance of whatever consensus has been reached among 
the nations on this point. . . .  [A desire to turn] to the legal consensus of 
civilized nations for assistance.”10 
Whatever the reason for deferring to the committee and its view of the 
reach, aegis, and ambit of Article 19, this is one option.  Spanking breaches 
human rights; this I know because international law and the committee 
tell me so. 
7. As this is a “committee” and not, say, the International Court of Justice, its
views are not made binding under the convention, but they are supposed to carry much 
weight.  See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 45. 
8.  See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8, 42d Sess.,
May 15–June 2, 2006, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007). 
9.  See id.
10.  Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129, 140, 144 (2005). 
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Go down the other road, however, and you refuse to be swayed by 
what this U.N. committee, set up to monitor the CRC, thinks.  This refusal, 
in its turn, can be motivated by two different concerns.  In other words, 
not very far down this second road you find that it splits or bifurcates. 
One path focuses on international law itself, accepts its core-level 
legitimacy in resolving such issues as parental corporal punishment but 
makes legalistic arguments for why the committee is wrong in its 
understanding of Article 19.  These legalistic rejoinders would no doubt 
focus on the legislative history of the CRC—what the states that signed 
it intended it to cover—your claim being that they did not intend it to 
cover parental spanking.  To buttress this claim about the intentions of 
the states that signed it, you would probably point to the fact that at the time 
of signing, virtually all the countries signing the CRC had domestic legal 
systems that allowed spanking.  This would be external evidence of likely 
intentions, it being unlikely that a government of a country with spanking 
would knowingly sign a treaty forbidding spanking.  And even if one or 
two governments did, perhaps to sidestep the need to change domestic 
law, it is implausible in the extreme that almost all governments signing the 
CRC did this.  Certainly, it is unlikely in the extreme that most democratic 
governments did. 
Notice that those who travel down this subbranch of the second road 
do not make core-level objections to rights-based international law itself 
being relevant, if not determinative.  No, they effectively simply argue 
for a different understanding of the proper meaning of Article 19.  Where 
the CRC committee seems to see Article 19 as a metaphorical living tree 
whose reach and meaning are not determined by the intentions of those 
states that signed it, those traveling down this subbranch want it interpreted 
differently, perhaps according to some form of originalism or other.  They 
do not shun, reject, or belittle rights-based international law itself.  They 
may just reject the committee and its views in favor of the text itself, a 
sort of Protestant approach11 to what international law does and does not 
demand.  In addition, no doubt some may seek a halfway house and say 
this sort of international law is not determinative and conclusive, merely 
a guide that is relevant and needs to be considered. 
Of course this second road of refusing to be swayed by what the CRC 
committee thinks about spanking has another subbranch.  Travelers 
11. This is not to say that I would want to frame the Committee on the Rights of
the Child as offering the Catholic approach, as it were. 
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down this subbranch do not make legalistic arguments about how the 
committee has erred in its understanding of what Article 19 covers.  No, 
much more fundamentally, they simply do not accept the core-level 
applicability of rights-based international law to the question of whether 
parents in some of the oldest democracies in the world can or cannot 
spank their children.  They not only dismiss the views of this handful of 
U.N.-appointed committee members, they dismiss, too, the relevance of 
rights-based international law itself to the issue.  For many such travelers 
down this second subbranch of this second road, it will be the fundamental 
lack of democratic legitimacy when it comes to international law that 
motivates their position.  If issues such as parental spanking are covered 
in whole or in part by an international law treaty couched in indeterminate, 
abstract terms, then to what extent must it follow that the scope for 
democratic decisionmaking and letting-the-numbers-count majoritarianism 
in long-established democracies has been narrowed and enervated? 
So this little case study leads on to my first critique, the charge that 
too much international law is undemocratic in its origins and effects. 
II. IT IS UNDEMOCRATIC
A.  Nontreaty-Based—or Undressed—International Law 
When talking of international law, there are two sorts.  The sort most 
lawyers—and virtually all laypeople—will be aware of and will think of 
when someone mentions or refers to international law is the treaty-based 
sort.  Countries get together and agree to a treaty or convention.  Perhaps 
it is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),12 the CRC,13 
or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.14  Not 
all countries sign them.  Not all countries ratify them.  Some that do are 
democratic countries; others that do are not—indeed some that sign are 
out-and-out authoritarian regimes. 
Amongst the democratic ones, the process for entering into and ratifying 
these treaties will vary.  Yet in all of them, it will involve some step that 
confers at least some democratic legitimacy, as we will see below, though 
of course the democratic respectability of treaties in jurisdictions such as 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom is less than it is in the 
United States, noticeably less in fact.  But it is not zero or nonexistent. 
12.  See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. 
13.  See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1.
14.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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However, let us put that sort of treaty-based international law aside for 
a moment and start elsewhere, with the sort that does not flow from 
treaties or conventions.  I am going to call this other sort of international 
law, the sort that does not flow from treaties or conventions, “undressed 
international law.”  I call it that because it has not yet been dressed up or 
formalized into a treaty.  It has not yet been agreed to by any democratically 
elected and accountable legislators or members of the executive branch. 
This undressed international law is known in legal academic circles as 
customary international law.15  Its content cannot be found by looking in 
some treaty or convention, whether one’s country has signed and ratified 
that treaty or not.  No, this undressed international law that we now turn 
to is the law that is inferred from the practice of states—or countries. 
Once a consistent and general practice of states has been identified—and 
note that this general state practice has to be something that is followed 
out of a sense of legal obligation—then it becomes part of this undressed 
international law and its binding legal norms.  International custom is 
that which has been identified as widespread state practice, when it has 
been engaged in out of a sense of legal obligation.16 
Now throughout that last paragraph, I deliberately used the passive voice. 
I spoke of practices that “are inferred” and “have been identified” so as 
intentionally to mask or gloss over the rather important question of who 
gets to do all this inferring, identifying, and deciding just when it is and 
is not that states are following some practice or other, and following it 
out of a sense of legal obligation. 
The beauty of the passive voice is that it can give the subtle impression 
that these practices somehow identify themselves or that some omniscient 
and unerring God is doing the identifying, inferring, and exercising of 
otherwise fallible judgment.  It can help remove from center stage the 
fundamental issue of who precisely it is that makes these inferences, 
identifies these practices, and decides not just that a practice exists but 
that it is motivated by a sense of legal obligation. 
In an article such as this, which critiques the undemocratic aspects of 
too much international law, that simply will not do.  So let us put away 
this dissembling and finessing use of the passive voice and start by focusing 
15.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1999). 
16.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055. 
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explicitly on these “who makes it?” and “where is the democratic input?” 
questions. 
Start with the former query.  The unadorned answer is that what are 
termed publicists determine this undressed international law.  The Statute of 
the International Court of Justice says it is “the most highly qualified 
publicists” who have the role of determining this subsidiary sort of 
international law.17 
Many of those falling into the category of “publicists”18 are legal 
academics; they are law professors.19  Not all law professors of course. 
You have to be someone who is knowledgeable and writes in this field 
of international law.  So you have to show technical mastery in the field. 
But you also have to demonstrate to those already recognized as being 
highly qualified publicists that you have what Harvard law professor Mark 
Tushnet describes as “soundness.” 
Soundness seems to require that one be committed to the project of international 
law, that is, to the proposition that nation-states ought to resolve an ever-
increasing number and ever-wider range of their disputes pursuant to existing 
and emergent rules of international law rather than, for example, by economic 
or, worse, military force.20 
Let me be a bit blunter.  No one gets to vote for these legal academic 
publicists.  They have no democratic warrant at all.  Even if we assumed 
that law professors as a group shared broadly similar political and moral 
views to the population at large—and that assumption is plain-out false 
and ridiculous21—this would still be immensely unrepresentative because 
only those unskeptical about the benefits of an ever-increasing role and 
scope for undressed, and dressed, international law can ever make it into 
the club. 
With a rather enjoyable dollop of understatement, Mark Tushnet goes 
on to comment on this soundness criterion, this need to be committed to 
the project, before an otherwise technically proficient law professor can 
qualify as a publicist.  Tushnet puts it rather drily as follows: 
This feature of the process of becoming a publicist gives the academic field 
some degree of self-containment.  One is writing in part for other legal academics, 
to achieve and sustain one’s position as a publicist.  But only in part, because 
17.  Id.
18.  See id.  I will consider judicial decisions below.
19.  See John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167, 1183 (2005). 
20.  Mark Tushnet, Academics as Law-Makers?, 29 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 19, 20
(2010). 
21.  In the United States, international law professors from elite universities
contribute to the Democrats over the Republicans by a ratio of nearly five to one.  See 
McGinnis et al., supra note 19, at 1182–83. 
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one is also writing for others committed to the project of international law, 
including notably decision-makers in institutions that clearly do make 
international law, such as judges on international tribunals and members of the 
International Law Commission.22 
In terms of who makes this undressed or customary international law, 
we have not yet moved beyond the part of publicists made up of law 
professors, and already there are rather massive deficiencies in terms of 
democratic input.  First off, law professors as a whole are significantly to 
the left of voters at large in their political and moral views.  Secondly, it 
is not all knowledgeable, technically accomplished international law 
legal academics who get to be publicists and so get to identify these 
practices of nation-states.  It is only that portion of the law professors 
who are considered sound when it comes to their commitment to the 
international law project.  Think of a self-selecting lawyerly caste of 
committed experts, and you will get the general idea. 
It is not difficult in the least to point out that excluding those who 
have a modicum of skepticism about international law’s benefits is an 
undemocratic roadblock or filter.  On any theory of democratic 
participation, thin or thick, the starting point is that you count everyone 
equally.23  There are no “we do not like your views or values” exclusions 
or filters at this initial stage.  Yet that sort of exclusion or filter is precisely 
what there is when it comes to who qualifies as a law professor publicist. 
That makes this sort of law doubly deficient in democratic terms.  Law 
professors as a whole are nowhere near being representative of voters; 
they are vastly more left wing on average, across the board, at least in 
the cosmopolitan left-wing lawyers sense, if not the union left-wing 
sense.  Moreover, even amongst international law professors as a whole, 
only true believers in the international law project have any realistic 
prospect of becoming a publicist—someone who gets to infer and identify 
what the supposed duty-motivated practices of states are and so tell us 
the content of this undressed international law. 
This is not letting-the-numbers-count democratic lawmaking.24  It is 
more like lawmaking by a caste of experts with views known to diverge 
22.  See Tushnet, supra note 20, at 20.
23. I offer a thin theory of democracy in James Allan, Thin Beats Fat Yet Again –
Conceptions of Democracy, 25 LAW & PHIL. 533 (2006). 
24. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to pay more regular consideration
to the International Law Commission’s views, and the International Law Commission 
has a more formalized system for eliciting and recording the views of states.  But this 
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from those of the majority or rather by those from that caste who can in 
addition pass a test of ideological purity.  When issues come up such as 
over the death penalty, whether what is known as hate speech must be 
criminalized, or how to structure labor laws, why should the laws on 
these issues that have been decided by the elected representatives of the 
voters be influenced in any way at all by customary international law—
by this thoroughly undemocratic, and doubly so, undressed international 
law? 
One of the trends of the recent past is that customary international law, 
or undressed international law, has expanded its reach.  It never used to 
concern itself with a nation’s treatment of its own citizens.  It very much 
was about the “law of nations.”25  Restricted in that way, as it used to be, 
one might still balk and say that a democracy such as the United States 
or the United Kingdom is better placed to decide the advisability of, say, 
preemptive war than some insular caste of publicists rummaging through 
the entrails of supposedly perceived state practices.  However, go back 
before undressed international law expanded its reach into the realm of 
how a nation-state treated its own citizens, and you can see that its scope 
for conflict with majoritarian, letting-the-numbers-count, democratic 
lawmaking is pretty small. 
Perhaps I can make that point in a better way.  If some journalist, NGO, 
or law professor is going to accuse an elected government of violating 
international law, of the undressed variety, the scope and ambit for doing 
so are considerably smaller where that same undressed international law 
confines itself to matters between nations.  You might find a few accusations 
about the illegality of preemptive war—though no doubt made in the 
context of Iraq rather than Kosovo—but not much in addition to that. 
However, allow undressed international law to inflate and expand its 
supposed jurisdiction to include how a nation treats its own citizens and 
the scope for conflict with the rules made by democratically elected 
lawmakers multiplies exponentially, making suddenly relevant domestic 
laws on hate speech, workplace relations, the death penalty, or anything 
in fact that can be translated or transliterated into the language of human 
rights. 
Of course that comparative assessment—that domestic law looks better 
in terms of quality, effectiveness, and legitimacy than international 
law—is true of only democracies.  With regard to most nondemocracies, 
and certainly the military juntas, the theocracies, and the one-party 
does not much detract from my claim as to democratic deficiency.  See Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, supra note 16, art. 50. 
25.  See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 777 (2001). 
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states, international law looks better than domestic law when it comes to 
how a nation treats its own citizens.  In other words, there is an 
asymmetry at work, even regarding legitimacy.  The wilder exponents of 
cultural relativism may wish to dissemble at this point or brazenly claim 
that international law is better than the domestic law of both 
nondemocracies and democracies. 
That sort of “international law is better” response fails both for being 
untrue and also for being somewhat—or wholly—inconsistent.  It is 
untrue because as a plain matter of empirical fact, democracies produce 
superior domestic laws to nondemocracies, pretty much across the board 
but especially when it comes to the sort of individual liberty and freedom 
entitlements that lie at the heart of those matters labeled “human rights 
concerns.”  Democracies are not just a little bit superior; they are massively 
so.  And these domestic laws of democracies are superior to international 
law as well, not just because the treaty-based sort requires compromises 
to get nondemocracies on board but because the undressed sort is made 
by such an unrepresentative and unaccountable cohort. 
One might be tempted, I suppose, to pretend that undressed international 
law is superior to all versions of domestic law, whether it comes from 
nondemocracies or democracies, and indulge in this pretense simply as a 
ruse to allow international law’s precepts to prevail in nondemocracies 
where they would clearly be an improvement.  This would amount to the 
“little white lie” school of thinking.  It would run something as follows: 
“I will assert the superiority and jurisdictional dominance of undressed 
international law over all types of domestic law, not because it is true but 
simply because I calculate that that fiction or sleight of hand will have 
the best chance of extending the norms of undressed international law in 
the world’s nondemocracies.  And the benefits of that would outweigh 
the costs, negatives, and downsides of having them leech into the world’s 
democracies.” 
One might be tempted by that line of thinking, but it is a temptation to 
be resisted.  Here is its fatal flaw or conceit.  The world’s nasty regimes will 
ignore undressed international law when it comes to how they treat their 
own citizens, and they will ignore it regardless of how far these international 
law norms influence and reshape things in the world’s democracies. 
That is the irony.  If your unspoken goal is to reform nondemocracies for 
the better by proclaiming the superiority and preeminence of undressed, 
and no doubt dressed, treaty-based international law, you will find that 
that does not come to pass.  Instead, you will end up influencing only the 
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democracies and on balance for the worse.  Therein lies the irony or flaw 
in this little-white-lie way of thinking. 
So in my view, any assertions along the lines that international law is 
better than the domestic law of democracies as regards how to deal with 
the democracies’ own citizens is untrue, and doubly so when we factor 
in the legitimacy benefits of “rule by the people” as opposed to “rule by 
international law publicists.”  That said, such assertions about the supposed 
superiority of undressed international law are also inconsistent in a way. 
At least that is the case if the first step or prong in the argument involves 
an unwillingness to say that the domestic laws of democracies, on average, 
over time, and overwhelmingly, are markedly superior to and better than 
those of nondemocracies.  Let us suppose one subscribes to a version of 
cultural relativism that forecloses judging between the laws of democracies 
and nondemocracies. 
My point is that if you feel you cannot judge between the domestic 
law of democracies and nondemocracies, weighing them up in terms of 
their competing effectiveness, legitimacy, and overall consequences, 
then you surely must also be foreclosed from asserting that undressed 
international law is better than or superior to any sort of domestic law, 
whatever its provenance.  Thinking you are not in a position to be able to 
judge any X better than Y is not a worldview that you can turn on and off 
at will, when convenient, or when it suits your core-level political 
preferences. 
Thus far we have considered only one group of contributors to undressed 
international law—those international law professors who not only have 
sufficient technical expertise but who also have been adjudged 
thoroughly sound and committed to its ongoing and expanding reach and 
influence.  True, it is not at all clear or definite who it is that dispenses 
the “you are sound” label or guarantee.  True, this group is in no way at all 
democratically chosen, accountable, or representative; indeed, as a 
group, it is self-selecting or self-appointed.  These publicists may have 
virtues when it comes to their role as lawmakers, but none of those 
virtues has any connection at all to democracy. 
We can see this in plain terms from one unashamed supporter, who 
tells us flat out that nation-states do not make customary or undressed 
international law.  No, “[i]t is made by the people that care; the professors, 
the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in 
leading international law journals.”26 
26. Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 399,
399 (1996). 
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As for evenhandedness, well, here is how the late Lord Rodger, then 
of the U.K.’s new Supreme Court—formerly known as the Judicial 
Committee of the House of Lords and still its top court—assesses that: 
   My impression is that much of the writing on public international law to 
which we are referred is slanted towards a particular result that the writer 
wishes to see prevail as the law.  It often appears that the writers have, say, a 
particular human rights agenda and that their book or article is written with a 
view to securing that it will come to form part of the corpus of writings which 
help to shape the law.  Indeed, often the writers sit on some international 
tribunal or other body which deals with the same matter.  On occasions, however, 
it is difficult to see how the writer’s argument is to be squared with the 
wording of the particular international instrument in question – however 
desirable the result may be.27 
That being so, and this being the highly unrepresentative and 
nonmajoritarian group that it is, it follows that as undressed international 
law expands its reach, scope, and authority in the democratic world, the 
result is at least some lessening or contraction of the scope, reach, and 
authority of majoritarian, democratic decisionmaking.  We may still count 
everyone as equal and let the numbers count in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom, but they will count for less than they 
did before this expansion of undressed international law.  Democracy, if 
only in small part and at the margins, will have declined. 
The picture for majoritarian democrats does not improve when we 
turn to the other main group of people who make undressed international 
law.28  These are the judges, the international law judges. 
Here we need to consider the United Nations’ International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and the fifteen judges who sit on this court.  Depending on 
how you categorize Venezuela and Russia, between a third and a half of 
the ICJ judges come from nondemocracies, which is a more circumspect 
and polite way of indicating that they hail as well from repressive, 
authoritarian regimes such as Sierra Leone, China, and Morocco.29  Given 
how they are selected, they lack even the indirect democratic credentials 
27. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Judges and Academics in the United Kingdom, 29
U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 29, 39 (2010). 
28. Article 38(1)(d) also authorizes having regard to national court decisions on
the content of international law as a subsidiary or evidentiary source of law.  See Statute 
of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, art. 38(1)(d). 
29. The current court includes members from China and Morocco; Sierra Leone
had a member on the court up until 2012.  The Court: All Members, INT’L CT. JUST., 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=2 (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
846 
of top judges appointed by the elected branches—the United States, 
Canada, and Australia—and then subject to a transparent and sometimes 
unsuccessful confirmation hearing—the United States. 
But I will postpone discussion of how ICJ judges are appointed until 
my discussion of the opaqueness of international law in my second 
heading below.  Suffice it here to note that the democratic credentials of 
the international law judges, those on the ICJ, are vanishingly slight to 
nonexistent.  And then let us move on to the better-known sort of 
international law. 
B.  Treaty-Based International Law 
When we turn to look at treaty-based international law and its democratic 
credentials, we first need to distinguish the United States and our three 
other Westminster democracies of Canada, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom.  You see, the democratic credentials of treaties are much higher 
in the United States.  That is because treaties with other countries—
bilateral or multilateral—cannot come into force in the United States 
until they have been passed by the elected upper house of the legislature, 
the Senate, and on a two-thirds approval basis at that.30  This is not true in 
the United Kingdom; it is not true in Canada; it is not true in Australia.  In 
all of these latter three jurisdictions, the executive branch of government 
can ratify treaties without any veto resting in, or any need to win a vote 
in, one of the elected legislatures.  That means that in the United States, 
President Clinton could sign the Kyoto Treaty but that it could not bind 
the United States until approved by the Senate, which approval never 
ended up being given.31  The same goes for submitting to an international 
criminal court or any sort of cap-and-trade emissions trading scheme for 
carbon dioxide between countries.  You need Senate approval that is not 
always forthcoming because of the fact that the President’s party does 
not always control the Senate, because of greater likelihood in a U.S. 
presidential system of legislators crossing party lines, and because of the 
supermajoritarian threshold for achieving treaty passage. 
By contrast, in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the executive 
branch of government is not forced to obtain the approval of elected 
legislators.  No, the executive branches of government in those three 
Westminster systems, using the prerogative power, can sign, enter into, 
and ratify treaties all on their own.  So bear that difference in mind in 
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
31.  See SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30692, GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 2 (2005). 
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what follows, as much more of the gravamen in this subpart is directed 
at these three non-U.S. countries. 
Having noted that, let us turn back to our case study, my example of 
the CRC and spanking, to consider two ways in which international law 
of the treaty-based kind is democratically deficient.  Now as it happens, 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom32 have all ratified or signed 
the CRC, unlike the United States.33  And as I have just noted, doing so 
in a Westminster system is easier than in the United States.  The executive 
can do so without any veto or blocking power lying in the hands of any 
part of the legislature.  Therefore, ratified treaties or conventions clearly 
have less democratic legitimacy in Canada, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom than they do in the United States.  Indeed this point is often 
overlooked.  When it comes to treaty-based international law and its 
democratic credentials, the United States looks better than any of our 
other three longstanding democracies. 
Now if you go back forty or fifty years, there was a tradeoff outside 
the United States for this lack of legislative input when it came to treaties 
and conventions.  That tradeoff was simply this: The executive could 
ratify and sign treaties all by itself under the prerogative power, yes.  But 
such treaties did not, let me doubly stress that negative, become part of 
the country’s domestic law.  It applied, perhaps, internationally.  It did 
not apply domestically—not unless it was incorporated into the country’s 
internal laws by also being passed by the elected legislature as a statute. 
In the absence of a ratified treaty being explicitly incorporated into 
domestic law in this way, it was not a source of valid law.  You could 
not argue in court that you should win because of this or that treaty; you 
could not argue that the written constitution meant this, rather than that, 
because of some treaty; and only at the margins, when there was clear 
32. This basic position was altered in the United Kingdom by the Constitutional
Reform and Governance Act 2010, sections 20–23, allowing Parliament to pass a 
resolution not to ratify a treaty.  See Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, 2010, 
c. 25, §§ 20–23 (U.K.).  However, under section 22, any minister may opt not to refer a
treaty to Parliament and so bypass this new “ask Parliament” regime entirely and without 
any recourse by the legislature.  See id. § 22.  In addition the upper house has no real “do 
not ratify” power under this statute.  And section 23 exempts certain categories of treaty 
entirely.  See id. § 23.  So on balance I believe that my main claim here as regards the United 
Kingdom remains largely correct. 
33.  See Chapter IV Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 3. 
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ambiguity, could you even argue that a statute meant X rather than Y 
because of this, that, or the other treaty. 
In that now bygone world, the American approach to treaties and 
conventions was in fact not more democratic than the approach in the 
Westminster world.  Sure, the Americans took treaties more seriously back 
then and one might have made an argument for the U.S. approach on 
that basis, that we should not ratify a treaty unless we are prepared to 
make it enforceable law.  That sort of argument would cash out in rule of 
law terms or don’t deal in aspirations terms.  But in no sense was the 
old Westminster approach to treaties any less democratic than the U.S. 
approach.  Americans did, and do, take treaties very seriously indeed and 
demand that they pass through the elected upper house Senate.  Our 
three Westminster countries did not, and do not, demand this, but then, a 
half century ago, any and all executive-ratified treaties did not become 
part of the domestic law.  Your average voter could ignore them.  Full stop. 
That is no longer the case in our three Westminster countries.  Judges 
have changed that.  Administrative law, the rules and regulations below 
the level of statute law and including judge-made ones about how 
tribunals must operate and who must be heard, became permeated with 
rules plucked by judges from these treaties.  Then statutes started to be 
interpreted with reference to these treaties from international law.  It did 
not matter that the treaties were not in orthodox terms part of the 
domestic law in Westminster systems.  The lack of democratic legitimacy 
compared with a U.S.-type setup for ratifying treaties did not matter to 
the judges either. 
You know the game.  First you start by appealing to treaties, however 
vague, amorphous, indeterminate, or couched in moral abstractions—
“all appropriate . . . measures to protect the child from . . . violence”34—
when the statute is ambiguous, and only then.  That seems fairly harmless. 
So after a while, once that has bedded down, you go further.  You make 
what the treaties say the presumptive way of interpreting all statutes so 
that only explicit, clear words in the statute overcome that presumption. 
No good reason is given for why this should be the default position or 
why an unincorporated treaty with patently flawed democratic credentials 
should have such power to influence the meaning of the legislature’s 
statutes, some enacted before the treaty was even signed and ratified. 
You just move on as though it is self-evident that democratically enacted 
statutes ought to be interpreted through the prism of this sort of treaty-
and-convention-focused international law. 
34. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
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From there it is a moderately short step to using these unincorporated 
treaties as filters for interpreting the written constitution.  That is what 
happens in Canada, though Australia still holds out against that last step, 
barely.35  Meanwhile in the United Kingdom, there is no written constitution, 
which forecloses this final step of using unincorporated treaties as filters 
for the task of constitutional interpretation.  Alas, that means only that using 
them to help decide what statutes mean in the United Kingdom is even 
more problematic and potentially countermajoritarian.  There, statutes 
matter more.  So interpreting them through the prism of treaties matters 
more too. 
I said above that there are two ways in which international law of the 
treaty-based kind is democratically deficient, and I have now outlined 
the first way.  It happens in our three Westminster countries when treaties 
that have been signed and ratified are used by judges to help make and 
remake administrative law and also to aid in interpreting statutes and 
constitutional provisions even to the point of making these treaties the 
default, presumptive positions of what statutes mean.  And all this even 
though these treaties and conventions have not been incorporated into 
domestic law and are not, on the orthodox understanding that takes 
democratic concerns seriously, part of the domestic law.  That is the 
first way, and it applies to only our three Westminster countries. 
The second way is worse.  This second way happens most publicly and 
most notoriously in the United States, possibly because of the very fact 
that Americans take ratifying treaties very seriously indeed and expect 
them to win clear democratic support at least in the Senate. 
What happens on this second scenario, and it is not easily defended if 
you are a democrat, is this: Judges once again are interpreting domestic 
legal texts such as statutes and constitutional provisions, just as above. 
And again, the judges are doing this interpreting by referring to treaties 
or conventions—they may be looking to the treaties for evidence of 
international views on some issue, or for a moral consensus on some 
rights-based disagreement, or to see what meaning to give some morally 
charged phrase or term, or something else.  For our purposes that is not 
the point when it comes to this second way in which treaty-based 
international law is democratically wanting, deficient, and exiguous. 
What is the point is that in this second scenario, the treaties and conventions 
the judges use have not even been ratified.  For example, they have 
35.  See Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 589–93 (Austl.).
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failed to win a majority vote in the Senate, if we focus on the United States 
for a moment.  These are therefore unratified treaties without the imprimatur 
or approval of the domestic democratic politics.  Either the treaty failed 
to win Senate approval, it was not even put to the Senate, or the President 
himself did not sign it.  And yet the judges use such a treaty to help them 
interpret, say, the U.S. Constitution. 
This is precisely what happened back in 2005 in Roper v. Simmons.36  
The U.S. Supreme Court in that case cited the CRC in the course of 
deciding what no “cruel and unusual punishment” meant in the Eighth 
Amendment.37  The issue for those Justices was whether the U.S. Bill of 
Rights meant they could strike down or invalidate democratically enacted 
laws that allowed for the possibility of executing juveniles.38 
In deciding that question, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, as I said, cited the CRC, the very same CRC from my above case 
study.39  But here is the thing.  The United States has never ratified this 
CRC.40  It has no democratic standing or pedigree at all.  None.  Zero. 
And yet it is being used to tell us what the over two centuries-old U.S. 
Bill of Rights and its Eighth Amendment mean.  
It does not stop there.  In that same case, the Justices—or those in the 
majority—cited another treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR).41  This treaty had been ratified by the United 
States, or rather most of it had.  Not all of it though.  The United States 
had entered a formal reservation against the ICCPR’s no death penalty 
provision, meaning that part of the treaty did not apply in the United 
States.42  But the Justices in Roper cited it anyway in the context of a death 
penalty case. 
Let me be blunt.  Top American Justices, in the course of deciding 
whether they would gainsay and overrule democratically elected legislators 
by invalidating one of their statutes, decided to cite and give weight to 
treaties that the elected political branches had rejected; they cited and 
gave weight to treaty-based international law that the elected branches 
36. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
37.  See id. at 576.
38.  See id. at 555–56.
39.  Id. at 576.
40.  UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2012, at 16 (2012), available
at http://www.unicef.org/sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar 
2012.pdf. 
41.  See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.  The treaty cited to is the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14. 
42.  See Chapter IV Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails 
.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last updated Feb. 19, 2014, 
1:02 PM). 
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had specifically and explicitly refused to incorporate into domestic law.43  
These top U.S. Justices, and it is only fair to say it was not all of them, 
exercised their countermajoritarian, antidemocratic Bill of Rights power 
to strike down statutes but not before referring to, considering, citing, 
and presumably giving at least some weight to an international treaty that 
the democratically accountable branches had rejected.  To put it mildly, 
this certainly raises issues of democratic legitimacy. 
Now supporters of this sort of use of nonratified treaty-based international 
law will point out that the top U.S. Justices who did this said they 
decided based on domestic materials and mentioned or cited the CRC 
and ICCPR only as “confirmation” of what they had anyway decided, 
namely to invalidate a democratically enacted law.44  Some supporters 
might even try to make a more subtle point.  They might suggest that 
these majority Justices were using these nonratified treaties as evidence 
of a consensus of the practice of other states, not as part of an attempt to 
discern some norm of international law. 
However, those attempts, and others, to explain away and legitimate 
this second way of using treaty-based international law will not satisfy 
the person like me who is worried about how this all encroaches on 
democracy.  Not by a long shot. 
Yet some past and present U.S. Supreme Court Justices vigorously 
defend this, and reliance on international law more generally, when 
speaking extrajudicially.  Take just a few examples.  Justice Stephen 
Breyer is a committed advocate of using international law in this way 
and indeed was one of those in the majority in Roper who did so.45 
Justice Ruth Ginsburg can be described in similar terms and was on the 
same majority side in Roper.46  In 2005, when giving the keynote address to 
the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law, Justice Ginsburg was vigorous in her defense of citing, referring to, 
43.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003); Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 707 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
734 (1997). 
44.  See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 654–59 
(2007). 
45.  See Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 
32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 421, 424 (2004). 
46. 543 U.S. at 554.
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and appealing to international law.47  She saw that as one of the “common 
denominators of basic fairness . . . between the governors and the 
governed.”48  Even Republican-appointed former Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, giving the keynote address to the same society three years 
earlier, said that “conclusions reached by . . . the international community 
should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”49 
However, take the debate down from the Olympian heights of 
disagreement-finessing abstractions to the quagmire of drawing highly 
contestable social policy lines—ones having to do with the death penalty 
and perhaps one day whether parents can spank their children—and it is 
not at all clear to me why treaty-based international law should influence 
in any way at all how the U.S. Bill of Rights is interpreted.  It is out-and-
out democratically illegitimate to pay any heed at all to a nonratified 
treaty such as the CRC. 
The authoritative scope for deciding issues via domestic democratic 
structures goes down—it reduces, declines, or becomes smaller—when 
judges appeal to nonratified treaties in the United States to influence in 
any way how they interpret important legal texts.  The same is true when 
judges in our three Westminster countries appeal to any treaties at all, 
even ratified ones, to give meaning to their important legal texts, leaving 
to one side instances where a treaty is put into the form of a statute and 
incorporated into domestic law by being passed by the legislature. 
This all means that the partisan of democratic decisionmaking can 
complain that the field that was formerly left for resolving issues by the 
elected branches has been narrowed and shrunk, at least at the margins, 
by this appeal to treaty-based international law, be it unratified ones in 
the United States or ratified ones in our other longstanding democracies. 
III. IT IS OPAQUE
Over two centuries ago, the philosopher, prison reformer, advocate of 
ever greater democracy, and legal commentator Jeremy Bentham—
famous today still for his exposition of the doctrine of utilitarianism50—
47.  See Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of
[Human]kind”: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 
Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351, 354–55 (2005). 
48.  Id. at 354 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49.  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 15, 2002), in 96 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002). 
50.  See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Methuen & Co. 1982) 
(1789) (discussing the principle of utility). 
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attacked the common law.51  Bentham thought there were big problems 
with this sort of judge-made law that we in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom all call “the common law.”  First off, 
it was retrospective.52  Judges made it at the point of application at the 
end of a lawsuit, focused on things that had already happened so that any 
changes in doctrine, however they might be dressed up, effectively had 
altered the rules of the game for the side that had relied on how things 
stood before this change of doctrine—for an anachronistic instance, the 
duties owed by a manufacturer to consumers of those goods not in a 
contractual relationship with that manufacturer.  The contrast with statute 
law enacted by an elected legislature and set to come into force on some 
specified future date could not be any more stark as regards this issue of 
the retrospectivity of the common law. 
The next problem Bentham identified was related to that first one. 
You see, in order to mask that retrospective element, many supporters of 
the common law talked as though the real, true common law had always 
been out there in the ether.53  For them, any change in doctrine announced 
by the judges amounted to telling the rest of us what had always been the 
correct understanding of the law.  It just had not been properly understood 
as such until now. 
Think of this as the “one right answer,” or “judges just discovering what 
was always out there,” or “it was implicitly part of the best understanding of 
the settled case law, though earlier judges had not yet recognized it” 
view of the common law.  It solved the problem of retrospectivity.  But 
the cure was in various respects worse than the disease.  It was worse 
because it rested on a patent and palpable fiction, that judges were not 
ever making law at the point of application.  No, they were merely 
announcing what had always been the law or the best understanding of 
earlier case law.  Bentham had a field day with such claims, which rely 
on pretending that judge-made law, the common law, does not involve 
any discretionary input by the judges who definitively decide a case.54  
So this was another ground he had for disparaging the common law. 
51.  See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 147–
260 (1986). 
52.  Id. at 207–08.
53.  See id. at 194, 208.
54.  See id. at 274.
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Bentham also thought this common law was too unsystematic and 
unfocused on achieving the greatest happiness of the greatest number.55  
He also saw this sort of judge-made law as extremely opaque and 
supremely undemocratic.56  Those who extolled the common law at least 
had to concede, thought Bentham, that it was the product of an 
unrepresentative, unaccountable lawyerly caste—“Judge & Co.”—
whose views, interests, and values often could and sometimes did differ 
from those of the majority.57  In such circumstances, why should the 
judges’ views become law?  On what grounds was that legitimate? 
In my view much of the Benthamite critique of the common law, the 
ruthless debunking of its pretensions and illegitimacies, also applies to 
customary international law.  I have already pointed out above some of 
the antidemocratic failings of this sort of undressed international law, 
and indeed of the treaty-based sort as well.  Yet although one of Bentham’s 
core grievances had to do with the undemocratic nature of “Judge & 
Co.” common law, the charge of its opaqueness or opacity was also 
prominent. 
International law can also quite fairly be charged with being opaque, 
more opaque than the domestic law of longstanding democracies such as 
the United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  For 
instance, let us return to how the fifteen judges of the ICJ are appointed. 
To become an ICJ judge, a candidate needs to be approved by both a 
majority of General Assembly countries and a majority of Security Council 
countries.58  As you would expect, this is a process chock full of lobbying, 
vote trading, and buying amongst regional blocs and other sorts of 
groupings.  In that sense it is a highly politicized process, indeed one 
where luck and fortuitous timing play a big role.  Having conceded that, 
you can see too that the appointments process for ICJ judges is nothing 
like the U.S. system for appointing and confirming Supreme Court 
Justices or judges.59  Both are politicized but in different ways.  The U.S. 
system forces candidates to answer highly charged questions.  Those 
questions can be evaded, true, but they nevertheless get to be asked in a 
very public way.  Also, the nominee’s personal outlook and sensibilities 
can be raised.  Most noticeably, candidates once nominated are sometimes 
55.  See id. at 204.
56.  See id. at 204–05.
57.  See id. at 205.
58. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, arts. 4, 10.
59.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (giving the President the power to appoint
“Judges of the supreme Court”). 
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rejected and blocked.60  In other words, there is a form of public deliberation, 
albeit an attenuated one. 
The ICJ appointments procedure is opaque to a high degree in 
comparison.  It is backroom, horse-trading, factional politics, where 
geography is a big factor.61  Even within democratic countries, the 
nominating of an ICJ candidate is insulated from any direct governmental 
input—an insulation that may be desirable when it comes to authoritarian 
regimes, though I suspect such regimes have more tools for getting their 
preferred candidate nominated anyway, but not to democratic ones. 
Take the United States.  The President does not nominate American 
candidates for ICJ openings.  Instead, nominations are made by something 
called a “national group” at the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The 
Hague.  It is the members of these national groups that are nominated by 
national governments.62  In a democracy, where a government’s recourse 
in the face of an unwanted nomination is highly constrained, these groups 
are insulated from public accountability and control by the elected 
government.  In nondemocracies, as I suggested above, governments 
probably have tools for getting their national group to give them the nominee 
they want, tools that are unavailable, and unwanted, in a democracy. 
On top of all that, the ICJ is not well known to citizens of democratic 
countries, or to those of nondemocratic nations.  The percentage of 
Americans that could name even a single ICJ judge, whether American 
or otherwise, would be vanishingly small.  The same goes for citizens of 
Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom.  New Zealand might possibly 
do marginally better on this count because its first ever ICJ nominee, 
Professor Kenneth Keith, made it successfully onto the court in the 
60. For example, in 1987, the Senate blocked the nomination of Robert Bork.
CNN Library, Supreme Court Nominations Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/ 
08/27/us/supreme-court-nominations-fast-facts/ (last updated Aug. 27, 2013, 5:16 PM). 
61.  See SPENCER ZIFCAK, UNITED NATIONS REFORM: HEADING NORTH OR SOUTH?
9 (2009); Ruth Mackenzie & Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the 
Independence of the International Judge, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 278–79 (2003).  For a 
general critique of judicial hubris when it comes to international law and to American 
judges citing international law, see Maimon Schwarzschild, Judicial Independence and 
Judicial Hubris, in THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES 177, 182–85 (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 
2012). 
62. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 16, arts. 4–5.
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relatively recent past.63  But the self-congratulatory press for that milestone 
has long since ebbed away, so it is probably much the same in New 
Zealand as elsewhere.  The ICJ gets little press; it is poorly understood; 
and its judges are unknown, even in legal circles, except those working 
in the field of international law.  Put bluntly, the top court itself has its 
judges chosen in an opaque—and undemocratic—way, and it operates 
overwhelmingly outside the public gaze, which is another sort of 
opaqueness. 
Then there is the issue of the reach of undressed customary international 
law, and whether it is quietly expanding unknown to most citizens in our 
four longstanding democracies.  Of course it may well be that judges on 
all courts have some interest in increasing the jurisdiction of the court on 
which they serve.  They will be subject to a temptation to increase that 
jurisdiction, to widen the numbers and sorts of cases their court can hear. 
Some judges resist this jurisdiction-expanding temptation better than 
others, but all are subject to it.  So it is at least plausible to assert that the 
judges of the ICJ have an incentive or stake in discerning, discovering, 
or asserting a wider—or indeed ever wider—scope for this sort of 
customary international law.  This will certainly be so when jurisdiction 
expands to encompass how a nation treats its own citizens.  Yet it will 
also be affected by the extent of discretionary power that these ICJ judges 
have when it comes to stating how far this undressed international law 
does, and does not, extend. 
Now as it happens, I think a case can be made that customary 
international law is expanding its reach, and in an opaque way.  There is 
a ratchet-up effect at work.  United States law professors John McGinnis 
and Ilya Somin attribute some of this ratchet-up effect or trend to a split 
amongst two schools who see undressed international law in quite 
different ways.  The older school, what they call the “classicists,” “believe 
that customary international law must be rooted in the widespread consensus 
of the actual practices of nation-states.”64  The job of publicists, on this 
view, is to look to see what states actually do.  It is a question of fact, 
even on the ancillary issue of what motivates any state action. 
Readers will notice that even on this classicist understanding, there 
will be disagreement.  People disagree about facts all the time.  And any 
particular publicist of classicist leanings might think the content of 
undressed international law is X while a fellow classical school member 
63.  See Audrey Young & Helen Tunnah, NZ Knight Elected Judge of World’s Top
Court, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (Nov. 9, 2005, 5:00 AM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/ 
article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10354326. 
64. John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our
Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1199 (2007). 
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might think it is X + A, X – Y + B, or anything else.  But their disagreement 
about content will be focused on facts, on what the actual practice of 
states is, and on whether such practices, when widespread, are motivated 
—as a matter of fact—by a sense of legal obligation. 
That will make the content of undressed international law inherently 
debatable and contentious.  But notice how much freer of a sense of moral 
proselytizing and morally pregnant human rights presuppositions it is 
compared with the alternative. 
That alternative to this older, classical school is the newer, “modern” 
school.  Professors McGinnis and Somin describe it as follows: 
   Under a more modern concept of international custom, many scholars embrace a 
methodology that permits substantial human rights norms to be encompassed 
within customary international law.  They relax the classical standards in several 
ways that accomplish this.  Instead of requiring that nation-states actually 
engage in a practice, they substitute statements by nation-states that give the 
norms verbal endorsement.  These include resolutions of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and multilateral treaties.65 
Very, very few people, lawyers included, are aware of this move away 
from an objective—if contentious and disputable—search for what states 
do66 to something less factual and more value-laden that builds in a 
substantial moral component or human rights input regardless of whether 
such norms are adhered to in fact or not—and despite the inherently 
debatable and disputable—and virtually always disputed—nature of human 
rights norms once they are brought down from the Olympian heights of 
moral abstractions and applied to real-life issues in the quagmire of day-
to-day social policymaking.  And so, any such process can be considered 
to be an opaque one. 
This newer, modern school relaxes the need to find actual widespread 
state practice or what states really do.  It relaxes that factual quest in favor 
of a more morally pregnant or substantive quest to say what states should 
do.  All that is needed are mere statements of verbal endorsement. 
First off, it seems to me that this newer, modern approach has more 
scope to make inroads into democracy by taking the second component 
of “acting out of a sense of legal obligation” and turning it from a question 
65.  Id. at 1200 (footnotes omitted).
66. I concede that the distinction between what states do and what they say is not
by any means watertight.  The latter might always provide some basis for the former.  So 
the point here is a relative one, the extent to which the latter is relied upon.  Or so it 
seems to me. 
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of fact—“Is this why states do X?”—into one more morally pregnant—
“Is this an instance in which we can infer that states should feel obliged 
to do this based on what they have said?”.  This is a move from an “is” 
not directly to an “ought” but rather to a sort of combination “is or ought.” 
In my view this second question has more jurisdiction-expanding potential. 
Yet secondly, and even if you disagree with that first claim, the more 
normatively charged “is plus ought” determination is a less transparent, 
more contestable, and more opaque determination than the straight out 
factual “is” one.  And that gives more open-ended discretionary power to 
publicists—meaning a handful of “sound” international law professors—
and to a few international law judges appointed in the most opaque way 
imaginable. 
IV. IT IS INEFFECTIVE
My third critique of international law, or rather of some aspects of 
international law, is that it is comparatively ineffective.  H. L. A. Hart, 
over fifty years ago, noted that there is a difference in the scope of 
enforceability between municipal law aimed at individual human beings 
and international law aimed at countries.  As regards the former, everyone 
is more or less equal; as regards the latter, single states can be stronger 
than all the rest combined.  Effective enforcement of the law in the case 
of the former is theoretically much easier than with the latter, where all 
may depend upon the “stronger than all the rest State” voluntarily 
complying with some law for it to be effective at all.67 
Or if we leave aside that sort of Hartian theoretical point about the 
enforceability of international law, it might be tempting here to rehearse 
a different sort of critique about ineffectiveness, say the well-known 
criticisms of various subsidiary parts of the United Nations—some of the 
second-tier agencies of the United Nations, and more particularly, the 
rights-related ones.  Take today’s U.N. Human Rights Council (UNHRC). 
This is an intergovernmental body, subsidiary to the U.N. General 
Assembly.68  In 2006, it replaced the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.69  
The council was created to replace the commission because the latter was 
widely seen to be—according to taste—ineffective, overly politicized, 
67.  See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961).
68.  Welcome to the Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. COUNCIL,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 
2014). 
69.  Eric Cox, State Interests and the Creation and Functioning of the United Nations
Human Rights Council, 6 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 87, 88 (2010). 
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controlled by voting blocs from the world’s despotic regimes, anti-Israel, 
anti-United States, or some combination of all of the above.70 
Now that the UNHRC has been up and running since 2006, it is widely 
seen to be—according to taste—ineffective, overly politicized, controlled 
by voting blocs from the world’s despotic regimes, anti-Israel, anti-United 
States, or some combination of all of the above.  Some think the council 
is even worse, even more dysfunctional, than its predecessor.  Indeed, under 
the George W. Bush Administration, the United States boycotted the 
council, though that boycott was lifted by the Obama Administration.71 
For our purposes here, the main feature of the council’s work to point 
to is the periodic reviews—where the council assesses the human rights 
situations in all 192 U.N. member states.72 
Leave aside the obvious observation that the world’s Sudans, Libyas, 
Chinas, Zimbabwes, Cubas, Irans, and Saudi Arabias are comparatively 
unmoved by such periodic reviews.  They might even get themselves 
voted onto the UNHRC—as Libya has, Cuba has, China has, Kyrgyzstan 
has, Pakistan has, Saudi Arabia has, and, well, you get the idea—in order to 
hamper critical periodic reviews by forming voting or power blocs.  But 
even if a periodic review does come out that is critical, the world’s 
authoritarian and theocratic states pay little attention.  They are ineffective.73 
Meanwhile if we turn to our four longstanding democracies of the 
United States, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the questions 
of “Who gets appointed to staff these periodic reviews?”; “Do their 
credentials make them better at spotting the rights-respecting course of 
action in cases where smart, nice, reasonable people simply disagree 
than the elected representatives of the people?”; and “Why should we 
70.  See id. at 87–88.
71.  Colum Lynch, U.S. To Seek Seat on U.N. Human Rights Council, WASH.
POST, Apr. 1, 2009, at A2. 
72.  See ZIFCAK, supra note 61, at 67–74.
73. In a different vein, but still related to the theme of ineffectiveness, there was a
case of a Human Rights Council periodic review of a Pacific Island state that was 
congratulated in its periodic review by a European state for decriminalizing homosexuality, 
and in the same periodic review, the same Pacific Island state was criticized by an 
Islamic state for, you guessed it, decriminalizing homosexuality.  See U.N. High Comm’r for 
Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of Violence Against 
Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, ¶¶ 40–44, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/19/41 (Nov. 17, 2011); Paul Canning, Seychelles To Decriminalise Homosexuality, 
Other Countries Say No and ‘Not Yet,’ LGBT ASYLUM NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http:// 
madikazemi.blogspot.com/2011/10/seychelles-to-decriminalise.html. 
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care what these periodic reviews allege?” simply cannot be answered in 
a way that favors these U.N. bureaucrats over elected politicians. 
But rather than pursue that particular aspect of international law’s 
ineffectiveness, I want instead to do two other things.  Firstly, I want to 
contrast rights-related international law to a different sort of international 
law and argue that that latter sort is anything but ineffective.  It is very 
effective indeed.  So my criticisms in this Article, as I made clear at the 
start, are directed at only some parts of the international law edifice.  Then, 
secondly, I want to focus on international criminal courts and suggest that 
the case for their effectiveness is much less than many might assume. 
For the first of those tasks, let us consider not a rights-related body but 
rather a trade-related one.  This is the World Trade Organization (WTO).74  
The WTO grew out of GATT, or rather the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade treaty.  Immediately after World War II, about two dozen 
countries participated in the U.S.-propelled negotiations to cut tariffs. 
These negotiations were independent of the rather grander attempt, the 
failed attempt, to agree to the Havana Charter, which would establish 
something that would be called the International Trade Organization or 
ITO.  The sideline GATT negotiations were completed in 1947, and GATT 
was born in 1948.75  It was assumed it would be temporary, lapsing once 
the Havana Charter came into force.76 
However, when the Truman Administration in the United States decided 
not to pursue congressional approval for the Havana Charter, only 
GATT was left.  And GATT was not only a document assumed by all and 
sundry to be temporary, it was also a narrowly focused agreement aimed at 
lowering tariffs.  GATT entered into force in 1948, and that was all there 
was for nearly half a century until the WTO was established in 1995.77  Yet 
GATT still remains the most important legal document in international 
trade law.  The WTO agreement that grew out of the Uruguay Round did 
not supplant or repeal the original GATT document; it merely complemented 
and supplemented GATT. 
Now a first thing to notice is that when supporters of rights-related 
CRC-type or ICCPR-type international law try to make an analogy to 
GATT and the WTO, remember this difference.  GATT and the WTO 
are ultimately focused on one thing, lowering—and perhaps one day even 
eliminating altogether—tariffs.  That is their aim, focus, and breadth of 
74. For more detail on the WTO, see RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY AND PRACTICE 35–37 (3d ed. 2008). 
75.  See The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
76.  See id.
77.  Id.
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concern.  It is a massively more circumscribed, contained, and inflation-
resistant one than some international convention that is pitched up in the 
Olympian heights of emotively appealing and disagreement-finessing 
moral abstractions—one that enumerates a list of vague, amorphous, and 
indeterminate moral entitlements in the language of rights.78 
Here is the next thing to notice about trade agreements.  Nation-states 
argue over every phrase, every word, and every comma.  In the history 
of GATT, there have been eight completed sets of rounds of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, all aimed at reducing trade barriers.79  These are 
increasingly difficult to complete—the Doha Round began in 2001 and 
is still yet to be completed80—for the very fact that they emphatically 
do not deal in finessing disagreement under the cover of moral abstractions, 
vagueness, and amorphousness.  These trade rounds, to the contrary, deal in 
spelling out in minute detail specifics; they enumerate and elaborate with 
precision; and they aim to make clear up front what countries have 
committed themselves to, and when.  There is no sense of having aimed 
for the woolliest, least demanding lowest common denominator, which 
in obverse terms is to say that nondemocracies have as much at stake as 
democracies, a situation wholly distinct from rights-related treaties. 
Trade agreements, in other words, are driven by self-interest that flows 
from a grasp of comparative advantage, an understanding that free 
trade—not mercantilism—creates the new wealth that can later be allocated 
as different countries choose, and a recognition that greater trade does 
not much—contrary to some—reduce the power of domestic governments. 
If you are in doubt about that last claim, take a visit to China some time 
and experience for yourself how enfeebled, or otherwise, the Communist 
Party government of China is.  This is the government that has signed 
China up to the WTO without any overly obvious inability to set domestic 
policy across the board. 
My point here is that the WTO process is one obsessed with detail and 
trying to spell out probable future scenarios and commitments.  It is one 
78. I say this while conceding that the scope or potential for inflation in the newer
WTO TRIPS Agreement and the General Agreement on Trade in Services is greater than 
it is as regards the older GATT aspects of the WTO. 
79. The rounds include the Geneva Round in 1947, Annecy Round in 1949, Torquay
Round in 1951, Geneva Round in 1956, Dillon Round in 1960–1961, Tokyo Round in 
1973–1979, and Uruguay Round in 1986–1994.  The GATT Years: From Havana to 
Marrakesh, supra note 75. 
80.  The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dd
a_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
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that aims to be a “no surprises,” up-front process.  It confronts disagreement 
in order to generate tradeoff compromises; it does not finesse disagreements 
for some later point-of-application interpreter to award the whole cake to 
one side or the other. 
Consider the approach to these GATT and WTO negotiations.  They 
take place on a product-by-product basis with a focus on reducing tariffs 
and in the context of an overarching Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
obligation found in Article I of GATT.  The general goal, as I have said, 
is to lower import barriers and to reduce export subsidies.  The MFN 
obligation requires member states to give the same lower-tariff deal or 
concessions to all other member states that they give to their most favored 
member state trading party.  Against that background and even though 
there are some exceptions to MFN treatment, you will see that this sort 
of trading regime significantly dispenses with reciprocity—you cannot 
demand something from country X in return for your lowering tariffs if 
you have already lowered them for any other WTO member country.81  
And any country can opt to leave the WTO, though none has done so.82 
Again, nothing like that seems true of treaties and conventions related 
to, say, the rights of the child, indigenous peoples, or the disabled.  And 
so this WTO process is less debilitating of democratic decisionmaking, 
is arguably slightly more transparent—or less opaque—and is certainly 
far more effective. 
We can even see that there are more constraints on the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body panels and Appellate Body than you find when U.S. courts 
are appealing to unratified treaties or the ICJ is indicating the reach of 
customary international law.  First off, in the WTO, there is no enforcement 
mechanism the winners can use against the losers other than being paid 
compensation or undertaking authorized retaliation—think of the EU’s 
ban on genetically modified crops, which fails the trade test, but that failure, 
or America’s winning at the WTO, cannot easily be used to change the 
EU policy, which still exists. 
Secondly, the extent of interpretive slippage in the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Understanding process at the appellate body stage has been 
very slight indeed.  At the WTO, we might see the appellate body allowing 
NGOs to submit briefs in cases or decide who has the burden of proof or 
81. Of course there is still a scintilla of reciprocity in the sense that when a state is
seeking to set its MFN tariff level for some particular product, it can, and often does, 
enter into negotiations with its main trading partners to secure reciprocal concessions 
that are then, post negotiations, all multilateralized via MFN.  But I do not think that 
takes away from my general point. 
82.  See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art.
XV, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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even, very rarely, cite eminent publicists.  But that is the scope of the 
slippage. 
Most relevantly of all for our purposes here, when it comes to the 
WTO, the outcomes are effective.  They influence the conduct of member 
states, democracies and nondemocracies.  Nor does the WTO much affect 
democratic decisionmaking.  Almost all the constraints came in the form 
of highly detailed and specific undertakings, not in the form of disagreement- 
finessing abstractions.  Or put differently, a democratic government in the 
past knew the exact detail—or rather almost all the detail—of what it 
was agreeing to.  There is little of the ratchet-up effect we have seen 
elsewhere. 
Perhaps I should sum up in especially blunt terms.  The WTO, as a 
supranational body, is much less democracy debilitating than rights-
related supranational bodies.  The deal is made up front.  It is procedurally 
easy to back out.  There is far less scope for inflation-enhancing “living 
document” interpretive approaches by those who judge disputes.  Those 
who breach their obligations face only the option of paying or authorized 
retaliation.  Widespread self-interest, in the form of the increasing 
generation of wealth, at least partly aligns outlooks.  Oh, and every country 
has a veto on any changes—you need unanimity to change the bargain. 
Hence some forms of international law are clearly very effective 
indeed. 
When it comes to the various international criminal courts, however, I 
am much more skeptical of their effectiveness.  To buttress that claim, 
let me begin by returning for a minute to Hart.  Recall Hart’s argument 
at the end of chapter nine of The Concept of Law.83  Hart was there 
considering, in effect, the Nuremberg trials after World War II.  Hart’s 
point, with which I agree, is that the attempted natural law defenses of 
those trials are unconvincing.  The better, more convincing way of 
understanding what was happening is that the victors after the war were 
passing retrospective laws making illegal what had been legal under the 
Nazi legal regime.  This could be justified, thought Hart, whenever the 
moral wrongness of using retrospective laws was clearly and unambiguously 
outweighed by the moral wickedness of what the defendants had done in 
the past under that former regime, which in Hart’s view and mine was 
the case with the top Nazis but may well not have been the case if we 
83.  HART, supra note 67, at 210–12.
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move forward in time and consider the prosecuting of, say, East German 
border guards after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Now if that is the situation in the absence of any international treaty 
dealing with the prosecuting of thuggish dictators and their cronies, one 
can certainly see that there will be benefits in moving to a state of affairs 
in which there exists a laid down, positive international law or treaty, 
known in advance, that makes illegal at international law morally egregious 
acts that were legal at the time under some jurisdiction’s municipal law. 
This international law would authorize prosecutions of the top political 
and military leaders who, under the domestic legal system that they 
controlled, had done nothing illegal. 
As I said, one can see the benefits of such an international criminal 
court or law.  Most obviously such an international law framework 
removes the need—after the downfall of some nasty regime—to rely on 
what are in effect retrospective laws to provide a basis for prosecuting 
the worst offenders.  I accept that benefit.  My claim here will be only that 
there are costs as well as benefits in making this move and hence that 
there are also grounds for being skeptical about the effectiveness of any 
such international criminal courts.84 
Take the International Criminal Court (ICC), which came into being in 
2002 when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court came 
into force.85  The costs that I would note are not that countries such as 
the United States, China, and Israel have not ratified this treaty and show 
no indication whatsoever of doing so.  Nor would I focus too much on the 
big expense of this court,86 with returns thus far that amount to one 
conviction,87 under appeal,88 an acquittal, also under appeal,89 with two 
dozen or so cases ongoing from thirty overall indictments.90  Nor, again, 
84. I will focus on the International Criminal Court, but a similar sort of analysis
is possible with the one-off international tribunals for Rwanda and the ex-Yugoslavia. 
85. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 91 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
86.  See Jon Silverman, Ten Years, $900m, One Verdict: Does the ICC Cost Too
Much?, BBC NEWS, www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-17351946 (last updated Mar. 14, 2012, 
5:55 PM). 
87.  Thomas Lubanga, Congolese warlord, was found guilty and sentenced to
fourteen years in prison.  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 
Decision on Sentence, ¶ 107 (July 10, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc 
1438370.pdf. 
88.  See Lubanga Case, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?
mod=drctimelinelubanga (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
89.  See Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Prosecution’s
Appeal, ¶¶ 1–3 (Dec. 20, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1531064.pdf. 
90.  See Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
situations and cases/Pages/situations and cases.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
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would my criticism be the one some make that this court seems to focus 
on only Africa.91 
Instead I want to point out the incentives such a court throws up when 
it comes to nasty people leading nasty regimes.  Those incentives are 
clear, namely that it is better to go down fighting than to strike some sort 
of Idi Amin or Augusto Pinochet-type deal to forsake power.  Now of 
course it is galling in the extreme to see someone as criminally culpable 
as Idi Amin leave power only to spend a decade or so in very comfortable 
retirement in Saudi Arabia.  Yet it is also the case that he did leave power 
under that deal and that Uganda did move on without him.  And if that is 
seen as a benefit, that in some circumstances the lesser evil is to get the 
thug out of power however galling the terms, then an international criminal 
court makes that almost impossible to accomplish.  Think of Zimbabwe 
and Mugabe or Syria and Assad, and ask why they would ever voluntarily 
relinquish power, however attractive the supposed deal.  They know, we 
know, that they will be tried under some sort of international law court, 
either the ICC—if it has jurisdiction92—or some special one-off Rwanda 
or ex-Yugoslavia-type tribunal if it does not.  Knowing that, they will 
not go; they cannot go, so they will fight to the end. 
Those are bad consequences that surely must be part of any sensible 
cost-benefit analysis of these sorts of international criminal courts and 
tribunals.  They put in place incentives that will have bad, as well as good, 
consequences.  Some will be unintended. 
There is no easy answer to any of this.  I merely note such ICC-type 
regimes have various costs that can be lumped under this last heading of 
mine of ineffectiveness. 
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this Article, I have tried to offer you a skeptical outsider’s view of 
some aspects of international law.  Perhaps the Article is best seen as an 
agnostic’s guide to—too much—international law.  Certainly there are 
aspects of international law that are ineffective, opaque, and undemocratic. 
And these IOUs are comparatively worse, and when it comes to democratic 
91.  See, e.g., Brendan O’Neill, The International Criminal Court Is, by Any
Objective Measurement, Racist. So Why Do Liberals Love It?, TELEGRAPH, http://blogs. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/brendanoneill2/100144112/the-international-criminal-court-is-by 
-any-objective-measurement-racist-so-why-do-liberals-love-it/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2012). 
92.  See Rome Statute, supra note 85, art. 5(1).
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credentials, then far worse than one sees in the domestic law of such 
longstanding democracies as the United States, Canada, Australia, and 
the United Kingdom. 
That is why I believe that a healthy dose of skepticism is warranted 
when it comes to international law, and most especially rights-related 
international law. 
